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Comment
Pedro v. Pedro: Consequences for Closely Held
Corporations and the At-Will Doctrine in
Minnesota
Sandra L. Schlafge
Brothers Alfred, Carl, and Eugene Pedro were equal own-
ers of a business for most of their adult lives.' Alfred Pedro
discovered a discrepancy of several hundred thousand dollars in
the financial records of their closely held corporation, the Pe-
dro Companies. 2 After he demanded an explanation, his rela-
tionship with his brothers deteriorated.3 Carl and Eugene
Pedro placed him on leave of absence and eventually dis-
charged him from employment.4
Alfred Pedro commenced a suit against his brothers, seek-
ing dissolution of the company and damages for wrongful ter-
mination.5 At trial, the jury found that a Stock Retirement
Agreement executed by the brothers was valid and enforceable,
and therefore awarded Alfred a buyout of his shares at the
specified purchase price.6 The jury also awarded $256,740 in
damages for wrongful termination.7 On appeal, the Minnesota




5. Id. Alfred also sought appointment of a receiver, alleged infliction of
emotional distress and slander, and asked for an award of attorney fees. Id.
The trial court denied his motion to amend the complaint to add a claim for
punitive damages; his claims for infliction of emotional distress and slander
also were dismissed during trial. Id
6. Id. The Stock Retirement Agreement (SRA) provided for a purchase
price of 75% of the net book value of outstanding shares at the end of the pre-
ceding calendar year. Id At trial, the jury also awarded damages of $500,000
for the brothers' failure to act openly, honestly, and fairly with Alfred. Id
The Minnesota Court of Appeals set this award aside and remanded for a de-
termination of whether the fair value of the shares was greater than the
buyout price under the SRA, the difference being the appropriate measure of
the damages Alfred suffered from being forced to sell his shares to the com-
pany. Id. at 288.
7. Id. at 287. The jury apparently based the damage award for lost wages
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Court of Appeals held that the reasonable expectations of a mi-
nority shareholder in a closely held corporation can be the basis
for a wrongful termination claim.8 The court of appeals deci-
sion in Pedro sets a precedent in Minnesota9 by creating a new
exception to the established employment at-will doctrine.'0 It
is also controversial because it may severely limit the right of
majority shareholders to terminate minority shareholders,
thereby affecting employer and employee relationships in
closely held corporations.'1
This Comment explores the significance of the Pedro deci-
sion. Part I discusses the evolution of legal protection for mi-
nority shareholders as employees of a closely held corporation.
Part II compares this protection with the protection provided to
employees in general by wrongful termination principles. Part
III analyzes the Pedro court's rationale for allowing a minority
shareholder to bring a cause of action for wrongful termination.
Part IV criticizes the court's reasoning and warns of the poten-
tial adverse effect Pedro may have on employment doctrine as
it relates to closely held corporations in Minnesota. This Com-
ment concludes by arguing that employee-shareholders of
closely held corporations are afforded adequate protection by
existing law and should not be granted a special remedy
through an unjustified interpretation of Minnesota corporate
and employment law.
upon a calculation of the present value of Alfred's future wages had he been
employed from the date of the termination until the age of 72 at the same sal-
ary, accounting for an annual increase of 4.5%. Id. at 289.
8. Id. at 288-89. The Minnesota Court of Appeals remanded these claims
to the trial court for a determination of whether the damages for lost wages
following the buyout were appropriately awarded. Id.
9. The Minnesota Supreme Court denied review, thereby leaving the
court of appeals decision as the law in Minnesota. See id. at 285.
10. Traditionally, employment relationships in Minnesota have been gov-
erned by the "at-will" doctrine, which provides that an employer may dis-
charge an employee for any reason whatsoever when there is no agreement
limiting discharge to just cause or specifying a definite period of employment.
See infra part II (describing the employment at-will doctrine in Minnesota).
11. A closely held corporation in Minnesota is a corporation with less than
35 shareholders. MINN. STAT. § 302A.011 subd. 6a (1990). Because more than
90% of all companies incorporated in Minnesota are closely held corporations,
the Pedro decision has significant consequences for the corporate community.
See Joseph E. Olson, Statutory Changes Improve Position of Minority Share-
holders in Closely-Held Corporations, HENNEPIN LAWYER, Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 12
n.34 (citing REPORT TO THE SENATE, 1983 SPECIAL PAMPHLET CONTAINING
M.S.A. CH. 302A, at viii); see also Alfred F. Conard, The Corporate Censu." A
Preliminary Exploration, 63 CAL. L. REV. 440, 458-59 (1975) (estimating that
over 90% of all corporations in 1970 had 10 or fewer shareholders).
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I. EVOLUTION OF THE CORPORATE LAW
PROTECTING MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS OF
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
There is a clear trend in the law toward providing remedies
for oppressed minority shareholders of closely held corpora-
tions. For decades, legal scholars have commented on the vul-
nerability of minority shareholders of closely held corporations
and have encouraged legislative protection.' 2 State legislatures
have responded to the concerns by passing legislation designed
to protect minority shareholders who have been "frozen out"
by the oppressive actions of majority shareholders. 13
A. THE NATURE OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS AND
TRADITIONAL CORPORATE LAW PRINCIPLES
The nature of a closely held corporation places the minor-
ity shareholder in a vulnerable position which traditional cor-
porate law fails to remedy. Typically, only a few shareholders
own stock in a close corporation. By definition, no established
market exists for closely held corporate stock. The shares are
not listed on exchanges and are rarely traded.14
Often, the shareholders of a closely held corporation live in
the same area, know each otber well, and are familiar with
each other's business acumen.15 In addition, the shareholders
typically participate actively in the management of the busi-
12. See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE COR-
PORATIONS (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS]; F.
HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEALs'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter O'NEAL's OPPRESSION]; Carlos L. Is-
raels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock and Dis-
solution, 19 U. Cm. L. REV. 778 (1952); F. Hodge O'Neal, Close Corporations.
Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAw. 873 (1978)
[hereinafter O'Neal, Existing Legislation]; Arthur D. Spratlin, Jr., Comment,
Modern Remedies for Oppression in the Closely Held Corporation, 60 Miss.
L.J. 405 (1990).
13. See irfra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (describing the term
"frozen out" and the vulnerable position of minority shareholders).
14. O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 12, § 1.07, at 24. In con-
trast, the publicly held corporation is often owned by numerous shareholders
who act as passive investors and are not employed by the corporation. Id.
Their interest in the corporation is thus limited to the amount of their dollar
investment in their shares, which can be sold at any time on the public mar-
ket, and is not tied to their salary and other employment benefits. Id. A sig-
nificant characteristic of shareholders of closely held corporations is their
dependence upon wages received from the corporation. Id. Because closely
held corporations characteristically do not pay dividends, the role of employee




ness.16 Minority shareholders do not typically anticipate future
disputes or oppression because of their close relationship with
the controlling shareholders. 17 Thus, they do not bargain for
employment agreements protecting against mistreatment.' 8
Traditional corporate law allows majority shareholders in
closely held corporations to "freeze out" minority shareholders
by withholding dividends or salaries and by limiting their par-
ticipation in the management of the company.19 Courts have
16. Id.
17. See O'Neal, EFxisting Legislation, supra note 12, at 881. Professor
O'Neal explains: "A person taking a minority position in a close corporation
often leaves himself vulnerable to squeeze-out or oppression by failing to insist
upon a shareholders' agreement or appropriate charter or bylaw provisions"
because of a lack of awareness of the risks or a weak bargaining position. Id.
at 883; see also Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558 (N.C. 1983) (stat-
ing that the practical realities of the close corporation often mean that the par-
ties will not bargain); Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and
Shareholders' Reasonable Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 224 (1988) (stat-
ing that advance planning usually is not explored by the shareholders and a
lack of a shareholder employment agreement is to be expected because of mu-
tual trust at the corporation's inception).
18. Id. Because of the unique position of minority shareholders, some
courts and commentators consider the relationship between closely held cor-
porate shareholders analogous to that of partners in a partnership. See West-
land Capital Corp. v. Lucht Eng'g, Inc., 308 N.W.2d 709, 712 (Minn. 1981)
(noting that a closely held corporation is in reality a "partnership in corporate
guise" and extending partnership standards to shareholders of the close corpo-
ration); see also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass.
1975) (holding that the stockholders in a close corporation "owe one another
substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that
partners owe to one another.... [Tihe 'utmost good faith and loyalty' "). The
close corporation has been defined as the "corporate entity typically organized
by an individual, or a group of individuals, seeking the recognized advantages
of incorporation.., but regarding themselves basically as partners and seeking
veto powers as among themselves much more akin to the partnership relation
than to the statutory scheme of representative corporate government." Is-
raels, supra note 12, at 778-79.
19. Spratlin, supra note 12, at 407. It is only in closely held corporations
that the noncontrolling shareholders can be 'ocked in" to a business in which
they may be deprived of any earnings and a voice in management by the op-
pressive actions of the controlling shareholders. Id. Because closely held cor-
porate shareholders typically have no available public markets in which to sell
their shares, they can be denied any return of investment if terminated by the
controlling shareholders. Shareholders in a closely held corporation thus have
far more at risk from the conduct of the controlling shareholders than do
shareholders in publicly held corporations. Thompson, supra note 17, at 196-
97, 237. In no other type of business arrangement do owners face the possibil-
ity of completely losing their investments by being excluded from employment
and denied profits. David A. Kendrick, Comment, The Strict Good Faith Stan-
dard-Fiduciary Duties to Minority Shareholders in Close Corporations, 33
MERcER L. REv. 595, 596 (1982). This is commonly described by legal commen-
tators and courts as a "freeze out" of the minority shareholder. Id. at 596; see,
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upheld these actions against attack under the traditional corpo-
rate concepts of majority rule and the business judgment rule.20
Early courts hesitated to order relief even when the controlling
interest subjected the minority shareholder to abuse.21
B. CRITIcIsMS OF THE TRADITIONAL LAw AND THE EVOLUTION
OF PROTECTION
Critics of traditional corporate law have focused attention
on the law's failure to protect "frozen-out" minority sharehold-
ers of closely held corporations&2 Professor F. Hodge O'Neal, a
leading authority on close corporations, has explained that the
e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976);
Kemp & Beatley, Inc. v. Gardstein (In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc.), 473 N.E.2d
1173, 1176 (N.Y. 1984); Taines v. Gene Barry One Hour Photo Process, Inc. (In
re Taines), 444 N.Y.S.2d 540, 541 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Topper v. Park Shera-
ton Park Pharmacy, Inc. (In re Topper), 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364 (N.Y. App. Div.
1980); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 386-87 (N.D. 1987); O'NEAL'S OP-
PRESSION, supra note 12, § 3.06. The position of the close corporate share-
holder is also distinguishable from that of a partner because of the illiquidity
of investment. The partner has the right to participate in management and to
dissolve the partnership. This gives partners rights under the law that a mi-
nority shareholder lacks. See Olson, supra note 11, at 10.
20. The majority rule concept allows majority shareholders to vote a mi-
nority shareholder out of the corporation because they control the vote of a
majority of the shares. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 197; Spratlin, supra
note 12, at 405.
The business judgment rule, as applied by the courts, presumes that the
directors of a corporation use their best business judgment when making deci-
sions and that courts should not second-guess these business decisions.
Thompson, supra note 17, at 197. Thus, courts traditionally have been hesitant
to interfere when a minority shareholder of a close corporation is "frozen out."
Id.; see also Joseph E. Olson, A Statutory Elixir for the Oppression Malady, 36
MERCER L. REv. 627, 628 (1985) (discussing the ability of the controlling share-
holder to use traditional corporate law principles to "confiscate" the capital of
the minority group); Thompson, supra note 17, at 236 (stating that the tradi-
tional corporate notions of centralized control, majority rule, and the presump-
tion of the corporation's permanence open the minority shareholders up to
potential abuse); Linda L. Shapiro, Note, Involuntary Dissolution of Close Cor-
porations for Mistreatment of Minority Shareholders, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 1119,
1149 (1982) (asserting that the principle of majority rule conflicts with the na-
ture of the close corporation).
21. See Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent
Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partner-
ships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REv. 1, 38 (1982).
22. In response to calls for reform, courts gradually began to order relief
based upon oppressive conduct. See, e.g., Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 53 N.W.
218 (Mich. 1892); Green v. National Advertising & Amusement Co., 162 N.W.
1056 (Minn. 1917). For an early discussion of the power of the courts to afford
the minority shareholder a remedy, see George D. Hornstein, A Remedy for
Corporate Abuse-Judicial Power to Wind Up a Corporation at the Suit of a
Minority Stockholder, 40 CoLum. L. REv. 220 (1940).
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elimination of minority shareholders from the directorate and
from the day-to-day operations of the company deny the share-
holder anything more than "a token return on his investment
even though the investment may be substantial."23 The termi-
nated minority shareholders' capital is, in effect, held hostage
by those in control of the corporation because there is no mar-
ketplace in which minority shareholders may sell their
shares.2
Courts, recognizing the vulnerable position of minority
shareholders, have called for state legislatures to provide reme-
dies.2 State legislatures have responded by increasing protec-
tion for oppressed minority shareholders. 26 Several state
legislatures have authorized relief for shareholders subjected to
"oppressive" or "unfairly prejudicial" conduct by the control-
ling interest.27
23. O'NEAL's OPPRESSION, supra note 12, § 3.06, at 37. Typically, a person
acquiring an interest in a close corporation expects to participate actively in
the corporation's affairs and may have no income other than salary. Id. Con-
sequently, being squeezed out of the corporation constitutes an immediate fi-
nancial crisis for the employee-shareholder. Id,
24. See Olson, supra note 20, at 628; see also McCauley v. Tom McCauley
& Son, 724 P.2d 232, 236 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that a minority share-
holder may be "held hostage" by the controlling interest of the close corpora-
tion because of the lack of a marketplace for the stock).
25. See, e.g., Villa Maria, Inc. v. Mondati (In re Villa Maria, Inc.), 312
N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. 1981); Westland Capital Corp. v. Lucht Eng'g Inc., 308
N.W.2d 709, 712 (Minn. 1981).
26. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30
(1990); see also Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 560 (N.C. 1983) (dis-
cussing the increasing number of states that have enacted more liberal statutes
in response to calls for reform); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388 (N.D.
1987) (holding that state statute which mentioned only dissolution as a remedy
for oppressive conduct allows alternative equitable remedies including buyout
at the fair value); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 395-
96 (Or. 1973) (stating that the court is not limited to the dissolution remedy
and listing ten alternative equitable remedies available to the court); Harry J.
Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a Remedy
for Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 25, 31-32 (1986-1987)
(identifying states that have authorized involuntary dissolution in certain cir-
cumstances); Spratlin, supra note 12, at 418 (discussing statutes passed in sev-
eral states). The Official Comment to § 40 of the Model Close Corporation
Statute states that §§ 40-43 of the proposed statute, which protect minority
shareholders, are based on provisions passed in California, Michigan, Minne-
sota, New Jersey, and South Carolina. MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPP.
§ 40 official cmt. (1991).
27. See, e.g., INN. STAT. § 302A.751 subd. 1(b)(2) (1990) (allowing relief
upon a finding that "the directors or those in control of the corporation have
acted fraudulently, illegally, or in a manner unfairly prejudicial"); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw § 1104-a(1) (1990) (allowing relief upon a finding of "illegal, fraud-
ulent or oppressive conduct").
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In applying statutes of this type, courts have developed a
standard, known as the "reasonable expectations" standard,
that defines which acts are oppressive and thus entitle minority
shareholders to relief.2s The reasonable expectations of minor-
ity shareholders in a closely held corporation often include sal-
ary and active participation in management as a key
employee.-9  One authority has stated: "The shareholder
purchases not stock, but a future. He is not investing in a legal
entity, but embarking with his friends on a cooperative adven-
ture. The reasonable expectations of such a shareholder are a
job, a salary, a significant place in management, and economic
security for his family."30 Courts consequently have held that
minority shareholders of a closely held corporation may obtain
relief when their expectations are frustrated.3 1
28. The North Carolina Supreme Court created a four-part test which
plaintiffs must satisfy in order to prove they had reasonable expectations. The
requirements are: (1) the plaintiff "had one or more substantial reasonable
expectations known or assumed by the other [parties]"; (2) the expectation
was frustrated; (3) "the frustration was without fault of the plaintiff" and "in
large part beyond his control"; and (4) "under all the circumstances of the
case" the plaintiff is entitled to "some form of equitable relief." Meiselman,
307 S.E.2d at 564. Professor O'Neal argues that the reasonable expectations of
minority shareholders are the most reliable guide to a just solution of disputes
among the shareholders in a close corporation and notes that courts are acting
with increasing frequency to protect these expectations. O'NEAL'S OPPRES-
SION, supra note 12, § 7:15, at 88-92; see also Topper v. Park Sheraton Phar-
macy, Inc. (In re Topper), 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364-65 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)
(holding that the reasonable expectations of the minority shareholders are the
appropriate standard to be used in defining whether the conduct of the con-
trolling shareholders is "oppressive" within the meaning of the statute). Com-
mentators also have criticized the reasonable expectations analysis by
suggesting that it does not consider the possibility that participants may have
private expectations which would not have been accepted by the majority had
they become aware of them. Hfllman, supra note 21, at 77-78. Only expecta-
tions resulting from express or implied understandings should be recognized.
29. Olson, supra note 20, at 629; Olson, supra note 11, at 18. The expecta-
tions of investors in a closely held corporation are quite different than those of
the typically passive investors in a publicly held corporation. Spratlin, supra
note 12, at 408. Both types of investors expect appreciation in the value of
their investment. Investors in publicly held corporations receive dividends as
a form of return on this investment, while investors in closely held corpora-
tions may expect to receive a salary and a management position as a condition
of their investment.
30. Olson, supra note 11, at 18.
31. Courts often define oppression broadly and hold that termination of
employment frustrates minority shareholders' reasonable expectations,
thereby qualifying the shareholders for equitable relief. See, e.g., O'Donnel v.
Marine Repair, 530 F. Supp. 1199, 1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (rejecting defendant's
argument that the termination was for good cause); Wilkes v. Springside Nurs-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The reasonable expectations standard is designed to resolve
conflicts among closely held corporate shareholders. 32 The
standard grants shareholders a method of liquidating their in-
vestments without greatly disrupting the continuity of the busi-
ness or crippling the entity.33 Courts determine reasonable
expectations by examining the entire history of the partici-
pants' relationship.34 Thus, the adoption of the reasonable ex-
pectations standard ensures an opportunity for frozen-out
minority shareholders in a closely held corporations to obtain
an investment return, without financially devastating the
corporation.
C. MINNESOTA STATUTES SECTION 302A.751
Minnesota Statutes Section 302A.751, enacted in 1981, re-
flected the trend toward increasing recognition of and legal
protection for the reasonable expectations of minority share-
holders of close corporations.3 5 By enacting Section 302A.751,
the Minnesota Legislature made three major changes in the
prior law.3 6 The most significant change was to provide the
courts with broad equitable powers of relief to remedy the
wrongs suffered by oppressed minority shareholders. 37 Second,
ing Home, 353 N.E.2d 657, 662-63 (Mass. 1976) (stating that the termination of
the minority stockholder's employment constitutes frustration by the majority
of the minority stockholder's purposes in entering the corporate venture and
denies an equal return of investment); Kemp & Beatley, Inc. v. Gardstein (In
re Kemp & Beatley, Inc.), 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1180-81 (N.Y. 1984); In re Burack,
524 N.Y.S.2d 457, 460 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Taines v. Gene Barry One Hour
Photo Process, Inc. (In re Taines), 444 N.Y.S.2d 540, 544 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981);
Topper v. Park Sheraton Pharmacy, Inc. (In re Topper), 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (stating that whether the controlling shareholder dis-
charged the petitioner for good cause or in good business judgment is irrele-
vant because the respondent's actions severely damaged the petitioner's
reasonable expectations); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388 (N.D. 1987)
("We find little relevance in whether Sylvester discharged Balvik from em-
ployment for cause.").
32. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 226. The breakdown of the personal
relationships that serve as the foundation of the closely held corporation often
results in conflicts which must be resolved by the courts.
33. Hillman, supra note 21, at 81-83.
34. See, e.g., Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983).
This includes the reasonable expectations at the inception of the corporation
and as they develop over time. Privately held expectations, not made known
to other participants, are not "reasonable." Id at 564.
35. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (1981), amended by MNN. STAT. § 302A.751
(1990).
36. 1981 Minn. Gen. Laws, ch. 270, § 108; see MINN. STAT. § 301.49 (1980),
repealed by MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (1981).
37. The new provision provided: "A court may grant any equitable relief
1078 [Vol. 76:1071
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the Minnesota Legislature broadened the standard for deter-
mining when relief was appropriate.s Third, it enacted a
mandatory buyout available to shareholders at the discretion of
the court.39
The Minnesota Legislature amended Section 302A.751 in
1983 to further strengthen the equitable remedies available to
mistreated noncontrolling shareholders and to change the stan-
dard of conduct that gives rise to liability.40 Minnesota Statutes
Section 302A.751 subdivision 1(b)(2) now provides minority
shareholders with equitable relief when it is established that
the directors or those in control have acted "in a manner un-
fairly prejudicial" to the shareholders.4' Additionally, the cur-
it deems just and reasonable in the circumstances or may dissolve a corpora-
tion and liquidate its assets and business" when the appropriate grounds for
relief exist. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (1981), amended by MN . STAT.
§ 302A.751 (1990). The only remedy the former statute mentioned was dissolu-
tion. See MINN. STAT. § 301.49 (1980), repealed by MINN. STAT. § 302A.751
(1981). The current statute authorizes the court to order equitable relief or a
mandatory buyout instead of involuntary dissolution. See MINN. STAT.
§ 302A.751 subd. 1 (1990). This significantly broadens the power of the courts
to grant relief to oppressed shareholders.
38. Shareholders were entitled to relief when they established that the
controlling persons acted "fraudulently, illegally, or in a manner persistently
unfair." MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 subd. 1(b)(2) (1981), amended by MINN. STAT.
§ 302A.751 (1990). This wording was adopted from the previous provision,
MINN. STAT. § 301.49 subd. 3 (1980), repealed by MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (1981).
However, the reporter's notes state that the 1981 provision was intended to be
interpreted more liberally in light of the court's power to order equitable re-
lief other than dissolution. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751, reporter's notes 1981
(West 1991). The standard for determining "persistent unfairness" should be
less stringent than that required to authorize dissolution. Id. The policy be-
hind this section is that "abuse of non-controlling shareholders is not to be tol-
erated." Id.
39. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 subd. 2 (1990) (limiting the availability of the
buyout to shareholders of closely held corporations). Under this provision, a
court could order any party to sell its shares to the corporation or to the share-
holders attempting to enforce the buyout; this is fully at its discretion. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 302A.751, reporter's notes 1981 (West 1991).
40. 1983 Minn. Gen. Laws, ch. 368, §§ 9 to 11; see MINN. STAT. § 302A.751
(1990) (amending MiNN. STAT. § 302A.751 (1981)); see also Olson, supra note
11, at 10 (as the drafter of the 1983 amendments, Professor Olson gives a de-
tailed analysis of Minnesota Statutes § 302A.751).
41. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 subd. 1(b)(2) (1990). Minnesota Statutes
§ 302A.751 states that equitable relief is available in an action by a shareholder
when "the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted fraudu-
lently, illegally, or in a manner unfairly prejudicial toward one or more share-
holders in their capacities as shareholders, directors, or officers, or as
employees of a closely held corporation." Id. "[U]nfairly prejudicial" conduct,
unlike the "persistently unfair" standard of the previous statute, only requires




rent provision refers to shareholders who are employees of the
closely held corporation.42 The reporter's comments to Section
302A.751 indicate that the termination of a shareholder-em-
ployee may be a ground for relief if found to be "unfairly
prejudicial."43
To assist courts considering equitable relief, the Minnesota
Legislature adopted the "reasonable expectations" standard as
a basis for determining whether conduct is "unfairly prejudi-
cial." 4 Termination of employment which frustrates a minor-
ity shareholder's reasonable expectations would qualify the
shareholder for equitable relief in Minnesota. Under Minne-
sota Statutes Section 302A.751, the court's remedial discretion
is unlimited.45 In the few cases considering this issue, Minne-
sota courts have been willing to use this equitable power to pro-
tect terminated minority shareholders, particularly by
providing relief in the form of a buyout.46
42. Id
43. Id-
44. Subdivision 3 provides that: "in determining whether to order equita-
ble relief, dissolution, or a buy-out, the court shall take into consideration...
the reasonable expectations of the shareholders as they exist at the inception
and develop during the course of the shareholders' relationship with the cor-
poration and with each other." MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 subd. 3 (1990). Profes-
sor O'Neal referred specifically to this provision as an example of the recent
codification of judicial use of the reasonable expectations standard. O'NEAL'S
OPPRESSION, supra note 12, § 7:15, at 88.
45. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 (1990); see Olson, supra note 11, at 19. The
goal in granting relief should be to achieve a balance so that the remedy is pro-
portioned to the degree of harm suffered. Olson, supra note 11, at 19. "Flexi-
bility and discretion are the hallmarks of section 751." Id. at 12. Despite this
broad grant of equitable powers, the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently re-
fused to order equitable relief pursuant to § 302A.751 when a plaintiff brought
a claim of breach of fiduciary duty based on his discharge from a closely held
corporation. Kelley v. Rudd, No. C7-91-1142, 1992 WL 3651, at *3 (Minn. Ct.
App. Jan. 14, 1992). The Kelley court refused to find that the defendant's dis-
charge of the plaintiff constituted unfairly prejudicial conduct entitling the
plaintiff to dissolve the corporation. Id,
46. See, e.g, Villa Maria, Inc. v. Mondati (In re Villa Maria), 312 N.W.2d
921 (Minn. 1981) (affirming the trial court decision, which gave the defendant
the option of buying out the plaintiff's shares, when solid grounds for dissolu-
tion existed under MINN. STAT. § 301.49 (1980)); Sawyer v. Curt & Co., Nos.
C7-90-2040, C9-90-2041, 1991 WL 65320, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 1991) (up-
holding the trial court's order of buyout by the nonmoving shareholders); Ev-
ans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (providing a mechanism
for a buyout). Professor Olson notes that the buyout is such an important
remedy that it is spelled out in Minnesota Statutes § 302A.751 subd. 2(a). Ol-
son, supra note 11, at 20. He explains that the buyout is the preferred remedy
for shareholder disputes because it allows a return of the shareholder's capital
while not crippling the business. Id at 17 (quoting REPORT OF THE COMMITrE
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II. PROTECTION FOR MINNESOTA EMPLOYEES
UNDER THE LAW OF WRONGFUL
TERMINATION
In addition to Minnesota Statutes Section 302A.751, which
grants equitable relief to employees of close corporations in
their capacity as minority shareholders,47 the law of wrongful
termination affords a remedy in the form of recovery of lost
salary to employees of all corporations.48 Employees of corpo-
rations, regardless of whether they are shareholders, also have
limited protection from wrongful discharge under exceptions to
the employment at-will doctrine. The at-will doctrine allows an
employer to terminate an employee with or without just
cause49 in the absence of an agreement limiting the employee's
discharge to just cause or specifying the term of employment.50
ON CLOSE CORPORATIONS TO THE ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON CORPORATION
LAW (Feb. 12, 1980)).
47. The equitable remedies granted to terminated shareholder-employees
of close corporations under § 302A.751, such as the buyout, provide a method
of returning the shareholder's capital. See Olson, supra note 20, at 646; Sprat-
lin, supra note 12, at 418-19.
48. Discharged employees who successfully prove that they were wrong-
fully terminated are entitled to monetary damages for lost wages. See, e.g.,
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 632 (Minn. 1983) (sus-
taining award of damages for lost wages); Bussard v. College of Saint Thomas,
Inc., 200 N.W.2d 155, 163 (Minn. 1972) (allowing plaintiff to seek damages for
wrongful termination but not specific performance); Kulkay v. Allied Cent.
Stores, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding jury's award
of monetary damages). In a publicly held corporation, terminated employees
who are also shareholders do not require judicial or statutory protection in or-
der to receive a return on investment. Thus, terminated employees of a pub-
licly held corporation are not "frozen out" in the same way as a terminated
employee of the close corporation, who can be denied all return on
investment.
49. See O'NEAL's OPPRESSION, supra note 12, § 3.06, at 39. The employ-
ment at-will doctrine has been embedded in employer-employee relationships
since the late 19th century when it was first propounded by H.G. Wood in his
treatise Master and Servant. See Kenneth T. Lopatka, The Emerging Law of
Wrongful Discharge-A Quadrennial Assessment of the Labor Law Issue of
the 80s, 40 Bus. LAw. 1, 4 (1984) (commenting that the at-will rule is a depar-
ture from English common law and traceable to the writing of legal commen-
tator H.G. Wood, who based the rule on the turn-of-the-century rationales of
mutuality and independent consideration); Charles A. Brake, Jr., Note, Limit-
ing the Right To Terminate at Will-Have the Courts Forgotten the Em-
ployer?, 35 VAND. L. REv. 201, 202 (1982).
50. A "terminable-at-will" contract is one that expressly states that it is
terminable at the will of the employer or the employee or fails to state that
the agreement is for a specified duration, thereby being for an indefinite term.
See 9 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1017 (3d
ed. 1967). Williston states that a contract not for a fixed term is a contract ter-
minable at will and that even when the employment is "permanent" or "for
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In recent years, commentators have extensively criticized
the traditionally rigid at-will doctrine.51 Courts have responded
and increasingly created exceptions to the rule by applying
principles of tort and contract law.52 For example, Minnesota
employment cases firmly establish that a contract for a "perma-
nent" or an indefinite term of employment is terminable at the
will of either party.5 3 However, the Minnesota Supreme Court
created a narrow exception, holding that the presence of in-
dependent consideration beyond personal employment services
can create an implied contract limiting discharge to good
cause.54
life," the majority of courts interpret this as being an agreement terminable by
either party at will. I&L § 1017, at 131-32.
51. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual
Freedom- On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 CoLurL L.
REV. 1404 (1967); Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment" A
Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHio ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Clyde W. Summers,
Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal" Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L.
REV. 481 (1976); Brake, supra note 49, at 202 (commenting on the recent
growth of criticism of the traditional at-will rule).
52. The erosion of the at-will rule is attributable to several factors, includ-
ing the nature of employment law, which has radically changed since the lais-
sez-faire atmosphere of the early 1900s. Employees today, who are
increasingly more dependent on corporate employers for economic survival,
struggle with inferior bargaining power in nonunion situations. Lopatka,
supra note 49, at 5. Judicial sympathy arising from inequitable corporate sce-
narios also has prompted courts to make exceptions. Id. at 5-6 (citing cases
basing exceptions on inequitable corporate scenarios). In the 1980s, judicial ac-
tivity increased significantly in the area of wrongful discharge, encouraged by
a growing body of legislation. Id. at 4. For an extensive discussion of the em-
ployment at-will doctrine and exceptions in Minnesota, see Susan F. Marrinan,
Employment At-Will: Pandora's Box May Have an Attractive Cover, 7 HAM-
LINE L. REv. 155 (1984); Sarah C. Steefel, Note, At-Will Employment-Con-
tractual Limitation of an Employer's Right to Terminate: Pine River State
Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983), 7 HAMUNE L. REv. 463 (1984).
53. See, e.g., Degen v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 110 N.W.2d 863,
866 (Minn. 1961) (rejecting plaintiff's claim for breach of a lifetime employ-
ment contract because the contract was of an indefinite term and therefore
terminable at will); Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 266 N.W. 872, 874 (Minn.
1936) (holding that a contract for permanent or life employment is terminable
at will without additional stipulation as to the duration of the employment or
additional consideration).
54. See Bussard v. College of St. Thomas, Inc., 200 N.W.2d 155, 161 (Minn.
1972) (plaintiff "purchased" a permanent employment promise with the agree-
ment that he would give the employer stock). In Skagerberg v. Blandin, the
Minnesota Supreme Court discussed cases in which the plaintiffs purchased
employment within the meaning of the independent consideration exception:
Pierce v. Tennessee C.I.R.R., 173 U.S. 1, 9 (1899) (holding that the plaintiff
who was injured on the job released the company from liability in exchange
for a promise of permanent employment); Carnig v. Carr, 46 N.E. 117, 118
(Mass. 1897) (holding that the plaintiff "purchased" employment by ceasing to
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The Minnesota Supreme Court created another limited
contractual exception to the at-will rule in Pine River State
Bank v. Mettille.-5 Mettille entered into an oral employment
agreement with the defendant bank which said nothing about
terms of employment.56 The bank later provided its employees
with a printed employee handbook containing sections on job
security and disciplinary policy.57 The court held that pledges
made after employment begins may become enforceable as part
of the original employment contract if they meet the require-
ments for the formation of a unilateral contract. 6 Subsequent
Minnesota cases have construed the unilateral contractual ex-
ception narrowly, requiring sufficient definiteness in handbook
work for the competition). Skagerberg, 266 N.W. at 874. The Skagerberg court
held that rejecting another offer and giving up an established business does
not constitute sufficient additional consideration to create an implied contract
limiting discharge to good cause. I& at 876-77; see also Degen, 110 N.W.2d at
867 (acceptance of a salary reduction is also not sufficient to constitute addi-
tional consideration).
Although Alfred Pedro brought a claim for "lifetime employment," the
valuable consideration exception does not apply because he did not establish
that he "purchased" his employment within the meaning of this exception.
Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 287 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). Alfred Pedro did
not furnish additional consideration for his employment beyond the normal
services required by the job as the employee did in Bussard. Pedro, 463
N.W.2d at 287.
55. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
56. I& at 624.
57. I& According to the bank president, the handbook was intended only
as a source of information and a guideline, not as part of the employees' em-
ployment contracts. I&
58. Id. The court enunciated a four-part test for determining when a uni-
lateral contract is formed by terms arising after employment has begun: (1)
the terms must be definite in form; (2) they must be communicated to the of-
feree; (3) they must be accepted by the offeree; and (4) they must be enforcea-
ble by consideration. Id at 626-27. It emphasized that the employee's
continued performance is sufficient consideration. Id. at 630. The Pine River
court distinguished this case from cases holding that additional, independent
consideration is a requirement for employees seeking to prove "lifetime" or
"permanent" employment. I& The provision labelled "Job Security" was not
considered sufficiently definite to constitute an offer. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d
at 630. However, the court found that the section entitled "Disciplinary Pol-
icy" was a definite offer communicated to and accepted by the plaintiff. Id,
The court, pointing specifically to the handbook, stated. "If an employee has
violated a company policy, the following procedure will apply." Id. Therefore,
the court found that the procedural disciplinary steps set out in the handbook
should have been followed by the bank to give Mettille the opportunity to re-
tain his job. Id. at 631. One commentator has characterized the holding in
Pine River as limited because it applies only to employers who distribute
handbooks with written provisions limiting termination to just cause. See
Steefel, supra note 52, at 464.
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terms prior to finding them to be part of the employment
contract.59
The Minnesota Court of Appeals recognized another type
of implied-in-law contractual exception in Eklund v. Vincent
Brass & Aluminum Co.6° When the plaintiff in Eklund ac-
cepted the defendant's job offer both parties intended it to be a
permanent position until retirement as long as the plaintiff per-
formed satisfactorily.61 Without warning or explanation, a new
president terminated the plaintiff four years later.62 The court
remanded the case for a determination of the "intentions of the
parties, [and] to determine whether the contract was in fact in-
definite as to duration." 3 In later cases the Minnesota Court of
Appeals has distinguished Eklund and refused to apply it to
similar oral employment agreement cases.6
59. See, e.g., Hunt v. IBM Mid Am. Employees Fed. Credit Union, 384
N.W.2d 853, 857 (Minn. 1986) (rejecting the claim that an employment manual
constituted an offer for a unilateral contract because the language on discipli-
nary action and termination was too indefinite to form the basis of an enforce-
able contract); Kulkay v. Allied Cent. Stores, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 577, 578 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing that general statements of personnel policy do not
meet the requirements for an offer according to Pine River, but holding the
policy language at issue to be sufficiently definite); see also Bakker v. Metro-
politan Pediatric, PA., 355 N.W.2d 330, 331 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting
plaintiff's argument that there was an implied offer in her long term of ser-
vice and good performance reviews). Courts in other jurisdictions are split on
whether post-employment documents can create an enforceable contract. See
Marrinan, supra note 52, at 187 (citing cases denying enforcement). Most
courts which refuse to enforce contracts have found that the employment doc-
uments were too general or were unilaterally adopted only by the employer.
See i&i
60. 351 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
61. Id at 373. The president of Vincent Brass approached the plaintiff
with the possibility of an offer for a job in another city. Though not seeking a
change in employment, the plaintiff discussed the job opportunity with the
president and informed him that he would consider the position only if it were
permanent as long as he performed satisfactorily. Id The plaintiff also in-
formed the president that he would be quitting a 26-year career at his current
place of employment and would have to relocate his family and sell his house
in order to take the new position. I&. There was no written agreement con-
firming these terms. Id.
62. 1& at 374.
63. 1& at 377. The former president of Vincent Brass signed a statement
asserting that the contract of employment included an understanding that the
plaintiff would be retained as long as he performed satisfactorily. Id. at 374-75.
He also stated that the plaintiff performed his responsibilities satisfactorily
and was a valuable team member. Id at 375.
64. See Dumas v. Kessler & Maguire Funeral Home, Inc., 380 N.W.2d 544
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986). In Dumas, the defendant discharged the plaintiff after
30 years of service. The plaintiff alleged that his employment contract in-
cluded implicit promises and covenants that he would not be discharged except
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Another exception to the at-will rule is the doctrine of
promissory estoppel.65 This exception applies when a promise
induces the promisee to act and the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce the action.6 The Minnesota courts have lim-
ited the application of this doctrine to cases in which actual re-
liance on an employer's promises has caused the promisee to
quit a former job.67
for just cause. Id. at 545. His supervisor informed him, furthermore, that they
would "retire together." Id. The Dumas court distinguished this case from
Eklund on the basis that the plaintiff in the latter case gave up other employ-
ment in reliance on promises of job security. Id. at 548. It emphasized that it
must consider the outward manifestations, rather than the subjective inten-
tions, of the parties as a matter of law. I& at 547 (citing Cedarstrand v. Lu-
theran Bhd., 117 N.W.2d 213, 221 (Minn. 1962)); see also Harris v. Mardan
Business Sys., Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350, 354 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting plain-
tiff's claim of an oral employment agreement based on defendant's statements
that the employment would be permanent, and distinguishing Eklund on the
basis that the employer in Eklund had stated in writing that they both had in-
tended the employment to run until retirement).
65. See, e.g., Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn.
1981).
66. Id. at 116 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACS § 90 (1932)).
67. Id (holding that the plaintiff's act of quitting another job in reliance
on a promised offer was sufficient to allow recovery of damages for defend-
ants anticipatory repudiation of the contract); Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Alu-
minum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371, 378 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing plaintiff to
bring promissory estoppel claim where he produced evidence that he relied on
a promise of permanent employment when he terminated his 26-year career
with his previous employer).
Despite the creation of these contract-based exceptions, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has refused to imply a covenant of good faith or fair dealing in
employment contracts. See, e.g., Hunt v. IBM Mid Am. Employees Fed. Credit
Union, 384 N.W.2d 853, 857-58 (Minn. 1986) (refusing to impose a good faith
requirement in employment contracts); Mason v. Farmers Ins. Cos., 281
N.W.2d 344, 347 (Minn. 1979) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that the good
faith requirement implied in sales contracts should be carried over to employ-
ment contracts); see also Wild v. Rarig, 234 N.W.2d 775, 790 (Minn. 1975) (hold-
ing that the bad faith termination of an employment contract is not an
independent tort permitting tort recovery), cert denied, 424 U.S. 902 (1976);
Eklund, 351 N.W.2d at 378.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Hunt refused to inject a duty to termi-
nate in good faith into employment contracts because "we feel it unnecessary
and unwarranted for the courts to become arbiters of any termination that
may have a tinge of bad faith attached. Imposing a good faith duty to termi-
nate would unduly restrict an employer's discretion in managing the work
force." Hunt, 384 N.W.2d at 858 (quoting Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,
335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis. 1983)); see also Mason, 281 N.W.2d at 347 (rejecting
plaintiff's argument that the good faith covenant implied in sales contracts
should be carried over to employment contracts); Bakker v. Metropolitan Pe-
diatric, P.A., 355 N.W.2d 330, 331 (Minn. Ct. App. 1934) (rejecting plaintiff's
claim for breach of an oral employment contract based on an implied limita-
tion of good cause).
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Although Minnesota courts have developed exceptions to
the at-will rule, they are limited in scope and narrowly applied.
In order to establish a wrongful termination in at-will employ-
ment, Minnesota courts have required an express agreement,
an agreement implied by definite contractual terms, or a prom-
ise inducing reliance. Prior to Pedro v. Pedro, the Minnesota
courts had not evidenced a willingness to erode the at-will em-
ployment rule with expansive exceptions6a
68. Public policy exceptions to the at-will rule have also been recognized
to a limited extent in Minnesota. See Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408
N.W.2d 569, 571 (Minn. 1987) (recognizing the existence of a limited public pol-
icy exception in Minnesota). These exceptions allow employees to bring a
cause of action for wrongful termination, despite the lack of an employment
agreement, when the termination violates public policy. The Phipps exception
is limited to a "clearly mandated public policy." Id. (stating that the plaintiff's
discharge violated the "clearly mandated public policy" of the Clean Air Act to
protect citizens and the environment). A 1989 decision by the Minnesota
Court of Appeals also reflects the courts' caution in applying the public policy
exception. See Vonch v. Carlson Cos., 439 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
The Vonch court emphasized that "[i]f actions are allowed when the public in-
terest is only marginally affected rather than where it is 'clearly mandated,'
the law of at-will employment will be seriously jeopardized, and the public
policy 'exception' to at-will employment will become the rule." I&L at 408.
Courts are cautious in creating an exception based on public policy consid-
erations; they have avoided defining public policy themselves and have re-
quired that the policy violated be defined specifically in a statute or
constitution before giving it application. See Marrinan, supra note 52, at 169
(stating that "[m]ost courts are cautious about finding a violation of an unar-
ticulated public policy and are more reluctant to create such public policy");
Steefel, supra note 52, at 468. But see Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d
549, 551 (N.H. 1974) (holding that the employer's conduct contravened general
public policy).
The Minnesota Legislature has given the courts some guidance by enact-
ing several statutes that create specific public policy limitations on the em-
ployer's right to discharge. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 593.50 (1990) (forbidding
employers from discharging employees for fulfilling their jury duty); id.
§ 176.82 (creating civil liability for employers who discharge an employee for
filing a worker's compensation claim); id. § 363.03 subd. 1(2)0b) (forbidding
employers from discharging on the basis of "race, color, creed, religion, na-
tional origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, mem-
bership or activity in a local commission, disability, or age").
A public policy exception does not apply in Pedro because Alfred Pedro's
brothers did not violate a statute or any specific public policy. Although the
facts behind Alfred Pedro's termination implicate his two brothers in suspi-
cious and greedy behavior, Alfred Pedro did not allege that he was terminated
in response to his refusal to participate in an activity that he believed was un-
lawful. Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 287 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
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III. PEDRO V. PEDRO: APPLYING WRONGFUL
TERMINATION LAW TO CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATIONS
In Pedro v. Pedro,69 the Minnesota Court of Appeals went
beyond the previously established exceptions to the at-will doc-
trine and adopted a new approach. Alfred Pedro discovered a
large financial discrepancy in the financial records of his fam-
ily- owned company.70 Subsequently, Alfred's relationship with
his brothers, who were also company shareholders, deterio-
rated, resulting in his termination.71 Alfred Pedro then sought
a dissolution of the corporation and damages for wrongful ter-
mination.72 A jury awarded him the right to a buyout of his
shares at the price provided for in a Stock Retirement Agree-
ment, damages for breach of fiduciary duty, and wrongful ter-
mination.73 The total award was $756,740, of which $256,740
was for the wrongful termination claim.74
The Minnesota Court of Appeals considered whether the
trial court erred in awarding damages both for wrongful termi-
nation and the right to a buyout of shares. 75 The court con-
cluded that the nature of closely held corporations and the
standard of reasonable expectations gave the trial court author-
ity to find liability for the wrongful termination of an em-
ployee-shareholder 76  despite the at-will doctrine.77  It
recognized that the general rule in Minnesota is that employ-
69. 463 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
70. I1& at 287.
71. Id at 285. The court did not fully discuss the circumstances of his ter-
mination. Id-
72. Id, at 286.
73. Id. at 287.
74. Id. Along with the $256,740 awarded for wrongful termination, the
jury also awarded $500,000 in damages for breach of fiduciary duty. Id.
75. Id. at 288. The court also considered whether the trial court erred in
finding a breach of fiduciary duty, and whether the trial court disregarded the
procedure for a buyout of shares provided for in Minnesota Statutes
§ 302A.751. Id- The buyout is not a controversial aspect of the Pedro decision,
as the Minnesota Legislature expressly included it as an option for the court in
granting relief to a frozen-out minority shareholder. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751
(1990); see Olson, supra note 11, at 20.
76. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d at 289-90.
77. Id. In remanding the case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Pedro
directed that the trial court decide what impact there was on the plaintiff's
right of employment until retirement. I& .The trial court previously found
that Alfred Pedro had two separate property rights in the company, employ-




ment for an indefinite term is "at-will."78s However, the court
focused instead on the special nature of employment in a
closely held corporation without stating an at-will theory to
support the claim of wrongful termination.79
At the trial level, the issue of wrongful termination cen-
tered on an interrogatory submitted to the jury which asked
whether there was an "expectation" that the plaintiff would be
employed by the Pedro Companies until he voluntarily re-
tired.80 The defendants contended that "agreement" should
have been used instead of "expectation" because the former
term erroneously suggested that a mere expectation of lifetime
employment was a sufficient basis for a finding of wrongful ter-
mination."' The court of appeals rejected this argument, refer-
ring to Minnesota Statutes Section 302A.751, subdivision 3,
which provides that a court should consider the reasonable ex-
pectations of the shareholders of a closely held corporation in
granting equitable relief.8 2 The Pedro court indicated that it
considered the shareholder's reasonable expectations in a
closely held corporation, rather than a contractual agreement
with the corporation, to be an appropriate basis for a claim of
wrongful termination.8o The court stated that "[i]n a closely
held corporation the nature of the employment of a share-
holder may create a reasonable expectation by the employee-
owner that his employment is not terminable at will." 4 Pedro
78. Id. at 289.
79. Id.
80. Id. The defendants argued that this interrogatory erroneously sug-
gested to the jury that Alfred's expectation of lifetime employment was a suf-
ficient basis for a finding of wrongful termination. Id. The argument over this
interrogatory constitutes the focal point of the controversy surrounding the
Pedro decision. In allowing the interrogatory with the word "expectation," the
Minnesota Court of Appeals applied the standard for relief found in Minne-
sota Statutes § 302A.751 to the law of wrongful termination. Id.
81. Id. at 289.
82. Id. at 289-90.
83. Id. Because the Pedro court did not extensively analyze the case, it is
unclear whether it intended to establish a new exception to the at-will
doctrine.
84. Id. The court emphasized that the employment relationship must be
ascertained by considering the negotiations of the parties, the parties' situa-
tions, the type of employment, and the circumstances of the case. Id. (citing
Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371, 376 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984)). This limited discussion is the extent of the court's analysis of the
at-will rule.
After its summary discussion of the at-will doctrine, the Pedro court fo-
cused on the reasonable expectations of shareholders in a closely held corpora-
tion. Id. At trial, the defendants argued that the employment relationship
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is thus notable for its application of employment law to closely
held corporationss 5
IV. PEDRO GOES TOO FAR
In Pedro, the Minnesota Court of Appeals extended the
law too far in its efforts to compensate a sympathetic plaintiff.s6
The court's interpretation of the law is not justified by the es-
tablished law of wrongful termination, and the court lacked
sufficient grounds for creating a new exception to the at-will
doctrine based on the nature of closely held corporations.8 7
was terminable at-will. I& The jury nonetheless found that the respondent
had a reasonable expectation of employment, creating the basis for a finding of
wrongful termination. I&
85. The "reasonable expectations" standard, as defined by courts and com-
mentators, affords frozen-out minority shareholders of a closely held corpora-
tion the opportunity to obtain a return on investment. The Minnesota
Legislature expressly enacted Minnesota Statutes § 302A.751 subd. 3 in order
to grant relief to employee-shareholders of a closely held corporation. The Pe-
dro court's use of the shareholder's "reasonable expectations" is not supported
by the established law of wrongful termination, which focuses on the existence
of express or implied contractual agreements between employees and employ-
ers. The Pedro court did not use the "reasonable expectations" standard to im-
ply a contractual agreement. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d at 289. Instead, it used the
standard to indicate that the nature of employment in a closely held corpora-
tion itself is sufficient to create a cause of action for wrongful termination,
without regard to the existence of any agreement HL
86. Although the court's opinion gives few facts about the termination of
Alfred Pedro, the plaintiff's brief emphasizes his sympathetic position. Alfred
Pedro had been employed for 45 years by his family-owned business. Respon-
dent's Brief and Appendix at 3, Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990) (No. C6-90-814). The business was started by Carl Pedro Sr. in the
early 1900s and recently grossed over six million dollars a year. I& In the fall
of 1986, several large accounting discrepancies became apparent in the corpo-
rate records. Id at 5. In February of 1987, a discrepancy of almost $330,000
was discovered. I& Alfred Pedro insisted on an investigation of the missing
funds. Id At the same time, his two brothers began criticizing his perform-
ance at work and told him to cooperate, resign, or be fired. I& at 6. He was
fired shortly thereafter, and all his pay and benefits were suspended. HL at 7.
The implication that can be drawn from these facts, left out of the opinion, is
that the two brothers conspired against Alfred Pedro for personal financial
gain.
87. Cases from other jurisdictions do not support the establishment of a
special exception to the at-will doctrine based on the employee's status as a
minority shareholder of a closely held corporation. See e.g., Ingle v. Glamore
Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1313 (N.Y. 1989) (expressly rejecting plain-
tiff's argument that employment was not at-will because of his status as mi-
nority shareholder of closely held corporation); Landorf v. Glottstein, 500
N.Y.S.2d 494, 499 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (stating that a minority shareholder of closely
held corporation was clearly an at-will employee because there was no con-
tract of employment), aff'd, 511 N.Y.S.2d 776 (App. Div. 1987).
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Further, the decision was unnecessary because minority share-
holder-employees of a closely held corporation are protected by
existing law.
A. ESTABLISHED AT-WILL DOCTRINE DOES NOT SUPPORT A
FINDING OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN PEDRO
Pedro's holding is not supported by the established law of
wrongful termination.ss Alfred Pedro did not have an oral or
written employment agreement with his brothers which lim-
ited their right to discharge him to good cause or which speci-
fied his term of employment. His employment was therefore
"at-will."89 Further, the narrow exceptions to the at-will doc-
trine do not apply to Pedro. Employees must have given in-
dependent consideration in order to bring a claim for
termination based on an oral agreement for "lifetime" or "per-
manent" employment.9° Alfred Pedro did not "purchase" his
employment within the meaning of this exception.
The unilateral contractual handbook exception also does
not apply.91 The Pedro court cited Pine River State Bank v.
Mettille92 for the proposition that the intent of the parties to
the employment contract must be ascertained before the em-
ployment relationship can be terminated at-will.93 However,
the Pine River court based its decision on the parties' contract
as reflected by written job security provisions in an employee
handbookP4 The Pine River court's narrow holding applied to
written personnel handbook provisions. The four-part test
adopted by the Pine River court requires a definite offer "de-
termined by the outward manifestations of the parties, not by
their subjective intention[s]. '' 95 There is no basis for concluding
88. The court cited two at-will cases: Pine River State Bank v. Mettille,
333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983), and Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co.,
351 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). Both of these cases focused on contrac-
tually based exceptions to the at-will doctrine. However, the Pedro court did
not base its decision on an express or implied contractual theory. Pedro, 463
N.W.2d at 289. The Pedro court did not give an at-will theory of law to support
the claim of wrongful termination. Id.
89. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (explaining the defini-
tion of at-will employment).
90. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text (explaining the unilat-
eral contract exception created in Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333
N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983)).
92. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
93. Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 287 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
94. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 627.
95. Id. at 626. The Pine River court emphasized that general policy state-
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that a definite offer, within the restrictive standards articulated
in Pine River, modified the status of Alfred Pedro's at-will em-
ployment.6 Courts have construed the Pine River unilateral
contract exception narrowly; therefore, it is not an appropriate
justification for permitting a "reasonable expectations" stan-
dard to modify at-will employment.
Also, the Pedro court cited Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Alu-
minum Cob. for the proposition that courts must consider "the
written and oral negotiations of the parties as well as the par-
ties' situation, the type of employment, and the particular cir-
cumstances of the case."98 In Eklund, however, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals created a narrow implied-in-law contractual
exception which is not applicable to Pedro.99 In Eklund, the
plaintiff produced a document written by his former employer
stating that he was hired with the understanding that he could
be discharged only for good cause.1 ° Applying the implied con-
tract theory, the Eklund court stated that this type of evidence
may be sufficient to overcome the general presumption that an
alleged permanent employment contract is not enforceable.' 0 '
There is no basis in Pedro for applying this implied-in-law con-
tractual exception. In contrast to the explicit promise required
by this exception, the Pedro brothers apparently never agreed
on the terms of their employment. Previous interpretations by
the Minnesota courts of the implied-in-law exception do not
support the position that "reasonable expectations," without a
promise or agreement, imply a contract limiting discharge to
ments do not meet the requirements of an offer, and cited as an example De-
gen v. Investors Diversified Servs, Inc., 110 N.W.2d 863 (Minn. 1961)
(upholding that an employer's statement to an employee that the employee
could consider the job a "career situation" was not considered an offer). Id.
96. The brothers' expectation that they would be employed for their life-
times is not sufficiently definite to be an offer. After Pine River was decided,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that implicit oral promises and covenants
that an employee would be terminated only for good cause do not modify an
at-will employment contract. See Dumas v. Kessler & Maguire Funeral Home,
Inc., 380 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). Further, a long term of ser-
vice and good performance does not constitute an implied offer. See i& at 546;
Bakker v. Metropolitan Pediatric, P.A., 355 N.W.2d 330, 331 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984).
97. 351 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
98. Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
99. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (explaining the Eklund
implied-in-law exception).
100. Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371, 374-75(Minn. Ct. App. 1984).




Moreover, other exceptions to the at-will doctrine do not
justify Alfred Pedro's claim of wrongful termination. 03
Although Alfred Pedro argued that the promissory estoppel
doctrine applied,104 Minnesota courts have applied this excep-
tion only when the promisee quit a job in reliance on an ex-
plicit promise of employment. 05 Alfred Pedro's argument that
he never looked elsewhere for employment in reliance on his
expectation of employment-1 6 is insufficient under current law
to justify a claim of wrongful termination. 0 7 Alfred Pedro did
not quit his job in reliance on a promise; therefore, this excep-
tion does not apply.
B. A STANDARD OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS AND THE
NATURE OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS Do NOT
JUSTIFY APPLICATION OF AT-WILL EXCEPTION IN
PEDRO
The Pedro court linked the law of wrongful termination
102. In fact, the courts have refused to hold that an employment contract
was more than an at-will contract even when employees have received implicit
promises of discharge only for good cause and have given years of satisfactory
service to the company. See, e.g., Dumas v. Kessler & Maguire Funeral Home,
Inc., 380 N.W.2d 544, 547-48 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Bakker v. Metropolitan Pe-
diatric, P.A., 355 N.W.2d 330, 331 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) ("If this contract has
an implied term of good cause before termination, then all at-will contracts
contain an implied limitation of good cause. That is not the law of
Minnesota.").
103. The public policy exception in Minnesota, see supra note 68 and ac-
companying text, does not apply to Pedro because there was no apparent viola-
tion of a clearly expressed statutory public policy. Alfred Pedro did not argue
that his brothers discharged him for refusing to violate a law or for threaten-
ing to expose any possibly illegal actions. If either of these circumstances ex-
isted, the plaintiff may have been protected by the public policy exception.
Further, although his brothers may have been acting in bad faith when they
terminated Alfred, there is no good faith requirement implied into employ-
ment contracts in Minnesota. See supra note 67 (describing why Minnesota
has refused to imply a good faith requirement).
104. Respondent's Brief at 15-16, Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990) (No. C6-90-814).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67 (describing the promissory
estoppel doctrine as recognized in Minnesota).
106. Respondent's Brief at 16, Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990) (No. C6-90-814).
107. See, e.g., Harris v. Mardan Business Sys., Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350, 354
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that the promissory estoppel
doctrine applies to an oral promise of "permanent" employment). Permitting
this argument would broaden the scope of the limited exception to cover every




with a standard of reasonable expectations developed to protect
minority shareholders of closely held corporations. This ap-
proach is justified neither by the law of wrongful termination
nor by existing law on reasonable expectations and closely held
corporations.
1. Section 302A.751 Does Not Apply to Wrongful Termination
Analysis
The Pedro court relied on Minnesota Statutes Section
302A.751, which allows courts to consider the shareholder's
"reasonable expectations" in granting a claim for wrongful ter-
mination.108 The Minnesota Legislature adopted the "reason-
able expectations" standard to address freeze-outs of minority
shareholders of closely held corporations by the majority share-
holders. °9 One of the Legislature's major goals in passing Sec-
tion 302A.751, consistent with the trend in other jurisdictions,
was to strengthen protection for minority shareholders sub-
jected to abuse.n  Accordingly, the statute provides for a
buyout, which the Minnesota Legislature described as the pre-
ferred remedy because it returns the shareholder's capital
while leaving the business entity intact."'
The Pedro court applied Section 302A.751 in approving the
trial court's award of a buyout pursuant to the Stock Retire-
ment Agreement." Thus, the court itself recognized that a
reasonable expectations analysis is appropriate under Section
302A.751 to ensure a return on investment to a minority share-
holder of a closely held corporation. Although Alfred Pedro's
expectations of job security as a closely held corporate share-
holder may have been defeated by his termination," 3 the court
108. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d at 289; see MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 subd. 3a. (1990).
109. See Olson, supra note 20, at 628 (discussing the abuse of the minority
shareholder, whose "capital is held hostage to the generosity of those in con-
trol of the corporation").
110. Olson, supra note 20, at 631; Olson, supra note 11, at 10-11. Professor
O'Neal has explainech
[O]bviously it is unjust to permit majority shareholders to oust the
minority shareholder from the directorate... especially if the corpo-
ration is paying no dividends, as is usually the case. Surely the law in
this situation should provide some remedy for the minority share-
holder whose expectations ... have been disappointed and who has
been deprived of any return at all on his investment in the company.
O'Neal, Existing Legislation, supra note 12, at 887.
111. MuN. STAT. § 302A.751 (1990).
112. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d at 289.
113. The court did not analyze the jury's basis for its finding that the plain-
tiff had a reasonable expectation of employment. Id. at 289. Alfred Pedro's
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compensated him appropriately by approving the buyout under
Section 302A.751.314
The "reasonable expectations" standard protects the vul-
nerable position of minority shareholders in a closely held cor-
poration. Section 302A.751 recognizes that shareholders in a
closely held corporation legitimately expect a return of their in-
vestment, often in the form of a management position and a
salary.115 This expectation should not, however, affect existing
employment law doctrine. The at-will doctrine concerns the re-
lationship of the employer and the employee, exclusive of the
role as shareholder. The at-will doctrine is premised on al-
lowing the employer discretion to terminate with limited re-
strictions.116 A shareholder's role is not the same as an
employee's; shareholders hold different expectations, and their
respective roles are protected by different standards. The rea-
sonable expectations provision in Section 302A.751 should not
be applied to the at-will doctrine. 1 7
2. The Adaptation of a "Reasonable Expectations" Standard
to the Law of Wrongful Termination May Erode
the At-Will Doctrine
Pedro has created what may become an extremely broad
exception to the at-will doctrine.118 Under Pedro, courts could
brief emphasized that he had an expectation of employment because the com-
pany was a family-owned business in which he had a 45-year career. Respon-
dent's Brief at 16, Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (No.
C6-90-814). The circumstances of his termination present a strong basis for
characterizing his treatment by his brothers as "unfairly prejudicial," thus
qualifying him for relief under the statute.
114. Courts in similar cases have consistently supported the application of
a reasonable expectations analysis in awarding relief to a terminated share-
holder who has been "frozen out" of the corporation. See supra note 31 and
accompanying text (describing decisions of other courts using reasonable ex-
pectations to award a return of investment to the frozen-out shareholder).
115. See supra part I (discussing expectations of shareholders of closely
held corporations).
116. See supra part II (discussing the at-will doctrine and its narrow
exceptions).
117. In a case decided after Pedro, the Minnesota Court of Appeals de-
clined to employ a reasonable expectations analysis to a wrongful termination
claim brought by a minority shareholder of a closely held corporation. Dullea
v. Dullea Co., No. C8-91-498, 1991 WL 271479, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 24,
1991). The court stated that "[u]nless the employee can prove the existence of
a contract requiring dismissal for cause only, the employer may fire the em-
ployee for any reason at any time, and the employee may quit for any reason
at any time." Id
118. The reasonable expectations standard, as adopted by legislatures and
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find that because of the nature of a closely held corporation,
any shareholder of a closely held corporation has "reasonable
expectations" of employment and therefore cannot be dis-
charged without just cause. The adoption of this standard sug-
gests an erosion of the at-will doctrine that sharply limits the
rights of majority shareholders to terminate minority share-
holders in a closely held corporation. Such a serious limitation
on the majority shareholder's right to terminate could jeopard-
ize the majority's control over the productivity of the employ-
ees and upset the balance between the interests of the
shareholders. Pedro gives minority shareholders sufficient bar-
gaining power to ensure their continued employment despite a
breakdown in the working relationships of the shareholders
which makes it unproductive to retain the minority share-
holder. This bargaining power arises from the crippling effect
that a claim for wrongful termination, in addition to a return of
investment pursuant to Minnesota Statutes Section 302A.751,
may have on the corporation's finances." 9
Further, the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized the
importance of an employer's discretion to manage the work
force and has suggested that employment law limitations on
courts in the context of protecting minority shareholders against oppression,
generally is applied to allow a terminated minority shareholder a return of in-
vestment. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. If applied in the same
way to employment law, the standard could extend an exception to the at-will
doctrine to all employee-shareholders of closely held corporations, based sim-
ply on the nature of the closely held corporation. Therefore, it is an easily
abused standard in this context and could allow minority shareholders undue
protection from termination that was never established by the traditional at-
will doctrine or Minnesota Statutes § 302A.751.
119. The closely held corporation may not be financially capable of contin-
uing its enterprise if shareholder-employees are afforded this type of broad at-
will exception. Discharged employees may be able to establish this exception
in many circumstances when they are not fired for just cause. They would
have a significant incentive to bring a wrongful termination suit and receive
large damages for wages and, in addition, receive a buyout of their shares
under Minnesota Statutes § 302A.751. This could amount to a possible wind-
fall for the employee and a financial disaster for the employer.
Professor Olson, the drafter of the 1983 amendments, has stated that the
buyout motion provided for in § 302A.751 is desirable because it allows non-
controlling shareholders to remove their investment while not granting them
disproportionate gains. Olson, supra note 11, at 20. Other commentators have
also suggested that the "reasonable expectations" analysis should provide
shareholders with a method of liquidating their investment which is least dis-
ruptive to the continuation of the corporation. Hillman, supra note 21, at 81.
Therefore, the balance of goals represented by § 302A.751 is not served by al-
lowing courts to use its "reasonable expectations" provision in the context of
employment law to cripple a closely held corporation.
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this discretion are best left to the Legislature. 20 Employer dis-
cretion is especially important at the managerial level because
of the necessarily subjective standards which govern a man-
ager's decisions. Because closely held corporate shareholder-
employees are likely to be managers, a major limitation on the
majority shareholder's discretion to terminate could be espe-
cially harmful to the functioning of the corporation.
C. EXISTING LAW ADEQUATELY PROTECTS EMPLOYEE-
SHAREHOLDERS OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
Courts should not afford special protection to minority
shareholder-employees of closely held corporations because
they are sufficiently protected by existing law. The Minnesota
Legislature has considered the vulnerability of minority share-
holders and protected their rights in Section 302A.751, which
prevents a "freeze-out" of the shareholder. The "reasonable
expectations" standard in Section 302A.751 is broad enough to
ensure that a terminated minority shareholder can receive a re-
turn on investment and, possibly, other equitable relief '21
Further, the law of wrongful termination protects share-
holders of closely held corporations as employees just as it pro-
tects employees of publicly held corporations. Terminated
minority shareholders may establish that an at-will exception
applies to their termination, and, therefore, they may be eligi-
ble to receive damages for wrongful termination along with a
return on investment under Section 302A.751. Closely held cor-
porate employees endure the same economic hardships as pub-
licly held corporate employees upon termination and should
120. See, e.g., Hunt v. IBM Mid Am. Employees Fed. Credit Union, 384
N.W.2d 853, 858-59 (Minn. 1986) (refusing to impose a good faith duty to termi-
nate on the basis that such an exception would restrict the employer's discre-
tion to manage the work force, and endorsing the view that such a change in
employment law should be left to the legislature); see also Marrinan, supra
note 52, at 192-200 (arguing for legislative reform of the at-will doctrine in the
interests of consistency and predictability).
121. Under § 302A.751, the court has authority to award broad equitable re-
lief. See supra notes 37, 45 and accompanying text (discussing the equitable
relief provision of Minn. Stat. § 302A.751 (1990)).
Additionally, a minority shareholder may be able to recover damages for a
breach of fiduciary duty. For example, in Pedro, the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals authorized the trial court to award damages for a breach of fiduciary
duty in addition to the damages for wrongful termination. Pedro v. Pedro, 463
N.W.2d 285, 288-90 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); see also Kelley v. Rudd, No. C7-91-
1142, 1992 WL 3651, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1992) (discussing reasonable
expectations of employment as a valid basis for a breach of fiduciary claim, cit-
ing Pedro as support).
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not be given a favored status by the courts simply because of
the form of their employment. In fact, this special treatment
favors employees who are usually high-level managers and who
are probably more fnancially stable than lower-level employ-
ees. Section 302A.751 takes reasonable expectations into ac-
count in compensating shareholder-employees of closely held
corporations who are frozen out. Thus, the Legislature was
aware of the vulnerability of minority shareholder-employees
in closely held corporations and adjusted the law accordingly.
Pedro over-protects the high-level employee at the expense
of the stability of Minnesota law governing closely held
corporations.
CONCLUSION
The Pedro court over-extended the law in applying the law
of wrongful termination to closely held corporations. The claim
of wrongful termination in Pedro was not justified by the ex-
isting at-will doctrine. Moreover, the Pedro court had no basis
for creating an exception to the at-will doctrine based on the
nature of closely held corporations and a minority sharehold-
ers' reasonable expectations. Minority shareholder-employees
of closely held corporations already are sufficiently protected
by Minnesota law.
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